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Abstract
The expanding volume of lawsuits and the ballooning of legal expenditures in recent years has
attracted the interest, concern, and even anger of the American public and politicians. These
developments have led law makers to consider alternative legal fee allocation rules as methods for
administering justice more efficiently.  Under the traditional American rule, parties to a lawsuit
must each pay their own legal expenses.  One reform proposal is the English rule, under which the
losing party must pay the prevailing party's attorney fees in addition to her own expenses.  To
evaluate the different effects of these two rules on litigant behavior and legal outcomes, we
conduct a theoretical and experimental analysis of environments which can be interpreted as legal
disputes in which the probability of winning a lawsuit is partially determined by the legal
expenditures of the litigants and partially determined by the inherent merits of the case.  We
investigate decisions regarding trial expenditure and examine the effects of the two allocation
rules on pretrial issues of suit and settlement.  The data demonstrate that game theoretic
equilibrium models produce good qualitative predictions of the relative institutional response to
changes in the allocation rule and to differences in such parameters as case merit and lawyer
productivity.  In our most significant result, we find that the English rule produces significantly
higher expenditure at trial than the American rule.  On the other hand, the frequency of trial is
significantly lower under the English rule.  Combining these two effects, we find that average
expenditure per legal dispute is higher under the English rule than under the American rule.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The expanding volume of lawsuits and the ballooning of legal expenditures in recent years has
attracted the interest, concern, and even anger of the American public and politicians.  The
number of lawsuits filed each year in the United States has grown steadily for several decades,
with new filings in state and federal courts now approaching 19 million annually [The Economist
1992].  The American tort system is the most expensive in the world, with annual costs estimated
at $117 billion [Hyde 1995].  Moreover, only about 40 cents from each dollar spent in this tort
system actually serves to compensate victims while most of the rest pays for lawyer fees
[O’Beirne 1995].  In addition, frequent examples of frivolous and outlandish suits in the popular
media have also served to heighten public anger.
These developments have led law makers and legal professionals to consider alternative legal fee
allocation rules as methods for administering justice more efficiently.  Under the traditional
American rule, parties to a lawsuit must each pay their own legal expenses.  One reform proposal
is the English rule (also known as the British rule, “loser pays” rule, or indemnity system) under
which the losing party must pay the prevailing party's attorney fees in addition to his or her own
expenses.  Both houses of Congress have recently passed legislation that mandates adoption of a
form of the English rule in certain federal court cases.
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2Proponents of the English rule contend that its adoption would lead to fewer "frivolous" lawsuits
and induce more of those suits that are filed to settle out of court.  A change to the English rule, it
is argued, would reduce the total volume of legal expenditure and eliminate the logjam of
lawsuits that exists under the American rule.  Nonetheless, there is considerable disagreement on
whether or not application of the English rule would actually have these desired consequences in
practice.  As of yet, there is no consensus regarding the positive or negative effects of a change in
legal fee allocation systems.
The implications of fee allocation rules are so widespread that any attempt to ascertain the full
implications are far beyond the scope of this study.   A narrowed focus is necessary.  The four
stages in the chronology of a legal dispute, as identified by Cooter and Rubinfeld [1989], are
illustrated in Figure 1 and will help provide a context for appropriately focusing the study.  At
every stage of a legal dispute, the parties involved make decisions that are influenced by their
expectations of what might occur at subsequent stages of the dispute.  As a result of this
backward induction process, the entire system of behavior is heavily influenced by behavior at the
(final) trial stage.  Therefore, to fully understand the effects of different fee allocation rules on
behavior and outcomes in legal disputes, a first investigation must focus on the effects at trial.
Much of our research design reflects this objective.
The primary focus of this paper is on the different effects of the American rule and English rule
on behavior and outcomes at trial.  We study environments which can be interpreted as a legal
procedure in which the probability of winning a lawsuit is partially determined by the relative
legal expenditures of the plaintiff and defendant and partially determined by the inherent merits of
the case.  In addition to investigating trial decisions regarding legal expenditure, we also examine
the effects of the two allocation rules on pretrial issues of suit and settlement.
The research poses four main questions.  Do the two fee allocation rules have different effects on
the level of legal expenditure?  Do they have different effects on the frequency of suit, settlement,
or trial?  Are there any other factors that influence such differences in behavior?  What are the
best models for understanding the behavior and outcomes observed?
32 EXISTING RESEARCH
Previous research into the legal and social effects of different legal fee allocation rules has
resulted in a wide variety of conclusions.  These conclusions are often completely contradictory,
particularly in the field of research regarding the effects on the frequency of suit, settlement, and
trial.  Several authors have concluded that a move from the American rule to the English rule
would result in an increase in the number of suits being filed and an increase in the number of
suits which proceed to trial  [Shavell 1982, Bebchuk 1984, P’ng 1987, Donohue 1991b, Hylton
1993].  On the other hand, several others have concluded that such a move would instead
decrease the number of suits and decrease the number of trials [Bowles 1987, Hause 1989, Hersch
1990, Spier 1994].  Still others have concluded that the number of suits and trials would
necessarily be the same under both rules [Reinganum and Wilde 1986, Donohue 1991a] or that
the effect of a change from one rule to the other would be ambiguous [Braeutigam, Owen, and
Panzar 1984, Katz 1987, Gravelle 1993, Beckner and Katz 1995].
All models applied to understand the impact of alternative legal fee allocation rules are based on
similar game-theoretic principles.  However, the papers reach different conclusions, in part,
because of the variety of conflicting (and sometimes restrictive) assumptions that are made by
different researchers.  The most significant assumption that has been made affecting this field of
interest is that legal expenditures are fixed and exogenously determined.  Under this assumption,
litigants do not choose levels of legal expenditure and such expenditure does not influence trial
outcome.  Therefore, there are no strategic decisions or implications after a case has proceeded
beyond settlement to trial.  The fixed expenditure assumption is prevalent in the classic law and
economics literature as well as recent analyses of fee allocation rules [Shavell 1982, Posner 1986,
Reinganum and Wilde 1986, Coursey and Stanley 1988, Donohue 1991a, Gravelle 1993, Hylton
1993, Spier 1994].
Several authors have, however, incorporated the trial effects of legal expenditure into their
examinations of fee allocation rules [Braeutigam, Owen, and Panzar 1984, Katz 1987, Plott 1987,
Hause 1989, Hersch 1990], and these authors have universally concluded that legal expenditure at
trial would be higher under the English rule than under the American rule.  Nonetheless, these
authors differ in their conclusions about the degree of difference in legal expenditure under the
two rules, and agreement does not exist on the specific effects on plaintiff versus defendant
expenditure.
4An additional assumption that influences the conclusions in this field of research is that plaintiffs
will bring suit if and only if they prefer trial to not filing suit [Shavell 1982, Hause 1989, Beckner
and Katz 1995].  Such an assumption excludes consideration of forward looking plaintiffs who
measure the expected gains from settlement as well as the expected gains from trial when
considering whether or not to file suit.  This assumption seems particularly troublesome when it is
considered that at least 10 suits are settled out of court for every one suit that is resolved at trial
[Boggs 1991].
The most significant empirical investigation of legal fee allocation rules has been conducted by
Hughes and Snyder [1990, 1995], who examined trial data related to the State of Florida’s
temporary adoption of the English rule for medical malpractice legislation from 1980 to 1985.
Hughes and Snyder concluded that the English rule produced significantly higher legal
expenditure at trial but also reduced the number of trials by increasing the probability that claims
would be dropped and increasing the likelihood of pretrial settlement for those claims that were
not dropped. Plaintiff success rates at trial, average jury awards, and the value of out-of-court
settlements were also all higher under the English rule than under the American rule.
Experimental research in the field of legal fee allocation mechanisms is very limited, although a
few authors have done important work.   Coursey and Stanley [1988] investigated the effect of
legal fee allocation rules on pretrial bargaining, observing that the English rule tended to induce
more settlements than the American rule.  This work is limited, however, by the previously
mentioned assumption of exogenously determined, fixed legal expenditures.  Thomas [1994]
incorporated the concept of endogenously chosen legal expenditures in an experimental
investigation of the trial selection effect, however this work is not directly related to the issue of
legal fee allocation rules.
3 EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT AND PROCEDURE
This section introduces an experimental environment which can be interpreted as a legal dispute
resolution procedure.  This environment will facilitate an investigation of the different
implications of the American and English rules.
53.1 NOTATION
The following notation will be necessary:
A = amount of lawsuit
CP = fixed cost to plaintiff for bringing suit
CD = fixed cost to defendant for going to trial
xP = legal expenditure of plaintiff at trial
xD = legal expenditure of defendant at trial
α = relative productivity of lawyers in influencing legal outcome ( 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 )
(portion of outcome probability determined by legal expenditures)
π = relative merit of plaintiff's case ( 0 ≤ π ≤ 1 )
(probability plaintiff wins case in the absence of lawyer influence)
P(xP,xD,α,π) = probability that plaintiff wins the case
3.2 DEFINITION OF FEE ALLOCATION RULES
Applying the above notation, we can now formally define the American and English rules for
allocation of legal fees.
American Rule:  If the plaintiff wins the case at trial, the payoff to the plaintiff is
ΠP
A =  A − CP − xP  while the payoff to the defendant is ΠD
A =  −A − CD −  xD .  If the defendant
wins the case at trial, the payoff to the plaintiff is ΠP
A =  − CP − xP  while the payoff to the
defendant is ΠD
A =  − CD − xD .
English Rule:  If the plaintiff wins the case at trial, the payoff to the plaintiff is ΠP
A =  A − CP
while the payoff to the defendant is ΠD
A =  −A − CD −  xP −  xD .  If the defendant wins the case
at trial, the payoff to the plaintiff is ΠP
A =  − CP − xP − xD  while the payoff to the defendant is
ΠD
A =  − CD .
63.3 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY
We will use a very explicit yet easily generalizable legal technology in this analysis.  This
technology is embodied in the function P(xP,xD,α,π), that is, the probability that the plaintiff wins
the case.  This probability is partially determined by the legal expenditures of the litigants (and
therefore by the activity of lawyers) and partially determined by the inherent merits of the case.
The specific functional form is as follows:
P(xP , xD,α ,π ) =  α
xP
xP + xD
 
  
 
   +  (1− α )π
This function has several interesting properties:
• The probability the plaintiff prevails at trial is positively related to the merit of the case, π.
• For α  > 0, the probability the plaintiff wins increases as he increases his legal expenditure at
trial.  The same is true for the defendant.
• The marginal productivity of legal expenditure is given by 
∂P(xP ,xD,α ,π )
∂xP
 =  
αxD
(xP + xD)
2
• The marginal productivity of legal expenditure increases as the productivity of lawyers, α,
increases
• The marginal productivity of legal expenditure decreases as total legal expenditure, xP+xD,
increases.
• Setting α  = 0 is equivalent to making the popular assumption that legal expenditure has no
influence on trial outcome.
• For all values of xP and xD, (1-α)π ≤ P(xP,xD,α,π) ≤ α+(1-α)π .
3.4 STRUCTURE OF THE EXPERIMENTAL LEGAL DISPUTE
The flow chart in Figure 2 illustrates the specific structure of the experimental legal dispute
within which litigant behavior under the two alternative allocation rules is evaluated.  During the
actual experiments, neutral non-legal terminology is used to identify roles and actions, however to
avoid confusion, we use the equivalent legal terminology in the description that follows.
7At the beginning of each legal dispute, every subject is randomly paired with another subject in
the room.  The identity of the persons they are paired with is never revealed to the subjects.  After
pairs are assigned, each member of each pair is randomly assigned a role, either plaintiff or
defendant.
After roles are assigned, a level of π, or merit of the case, is randomly assigned to each pair.  The
three possible levels of π are 0.25, 0.50, or 0.75.  We will sometimes refer to a lawsuit with
π=0.25 as a “frivolous” lawsuit, a lawsuit with π=0.50 as a “closely contested” lawsuit, and a
lawsuit with π=0.75 as a “strong” lawsuit.
Next, each subject's role and merit is revealed to him or her.  During the first series of
experiments, Series 1, the assigned merit is revealed to the subjects with certainty.  During Series
2, however, the merit is revealed with uncertainty, with each subject having a 60% chance of
having the correct merit revealed to him or her and a 20% chance of having each of the other two
incorrect merits revealed.  For example, if a pair of subjects is assigned a merit of π = 0.50, each
subject in the pair would have a 60% chance of being shown π = 0.50, a 20% chance of being
shown π = 0.25, and a 20% chance of being shown π = 0.75.
Series 1 experiments will be referred to as "known merit" experiments while Series 2 experiments
will be called "uncertain merit" experiments.  The uncertain revelation of merit in the Series 2
experiments can be seen to represent incomplete discovery or imprecise communication between
lawyer and client prior to trial.  The subjects for the Series 2 experiments are selected from
experienced subjects who have previously participated in Series 1 experiments.
After the revelation of roles and merits, the plaintiff in each pair is asked to choose whether to file
suit or not file suit.  If the plaintiff chooses to not file suit, the period ends for that pair and each
receives a payoff of 0.  If the plaintiff chooses to file suit, he incurs the fixed cost of CP for filing
suit and the defendant is then asked whether she wants to settle or not settle.
In this experimental legal dispute, settlement means that the defendant simply pays the plaintiff
the amount, A, for which the plaintiff is suing.  We call this the “forfeiture settlement
mechanism.”  This form of settlement is obviously extreme in the sense that no compromise is
possible, however, this mechanism was chosen for several important reasons.  First of all,
theoretical and experimental analysis of the settlement bargaining process is a field of research
8without consensus about the proper model, and thus a somewhat arbitrary decision must be made
when choosing a settlement mechanism.  Moreover, in order to maintain adequate experimental
control, we must employ a mechanism that minimizes the number of variables by limiting the
interaction between litigants.  The forfeiture settlement mechanism achieves this objective while
still providing a reasonable opportunity for a significant number of disputes to be resolved prior
to trial.  Furthermore, although a restrictive mechanism may reduce the number of disputes
settled, divergence in the frequency of settlement still provides valuable information about the
different settlement incentives under the two alternative fee allocation rules.  Lastly, since our
primary interest is expenditure decisions at trial, we need to use a restrictive settlement
mechanism to ensure that a sufficient number of legal disputes proceed to trial.
If the defendant chooses to settle, the plaintiff receives a payoff of A-CP, while the defendant
receives a payoff of -A.  If the defendant chooses to not settle, the case proceeds to trial and each
subject in the pair then chooses an amount, xP or xD, to invest in legal expenditure at trial.
The probability that the plaintiff wins the case at trial is given by the legal technology function,
P(xP,xD,α,π), specified above.  The verdict is then determined by a random draw.  If the plaintiff
prevails at trial, he receives a payoff of A-CP-xP under the American rule or A-CP under the
English rule, while the defendant receives a payoff of -A-CD-xD or -A-CD-xP-xD under the two
rules respectively.  If the defendant prevails at trial, she receives a payoff of -CD-xD under the
American rule or -CD under the English rule, while the plaintiff receives a payoff of -CP-xP or -
CP-xP-xD under the two rules respectively.
3.5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN PARAMETERS
A total of six experimental sessions were conducted with 10 or 12 students at the California
Institute of Technology participating as subjects in each session.  The experiments were
conducted using a network of computers among the subjects, with subjects making decisions by
pressing the appropriate keys on the keyboard.
The sessions are broken into 40 experimental periods, with each subject participating in a separate
legal dispute each period. Half of all experimental disputes are conducted under the American
rule, and half are conducted under the English rule.
9During each experimental session, the productivity of lawyers, α, is fixed at either 0.25 (low
productivity), 0.50 (medium productivity), or 0.75 (high productivity).  Two sessions have been
conducted for each different level of lawyer productivity.
The currency used in the experiments is “francs,” with five francs equivalent to one cent.  Each
experimental period, subjects receive a payment of 400 francs in addition to their payoff or loss
from the legal dispute during the period.  In all experimental sessions, the amount of the dispute,
A, is set equal to 240 francs and the fixed costs, CP and CD, are both set equal to 10 francs.  In
addition, the chosen levels of legal expenditure at trial, xP and xD, are permitted to be any value
between 0 and 1000 francs.  In the end, the average cash payout for each experiment conducted
was between 25 and 30 dollars per subject.
For additional clarification of the experimental environment and procedures, complete
instructions and subject handouts from one experiment are included in the Appendix.
4 MODELS AND PREDICTIONS
In this section we discuss the predictions of behavior provided by the solution concepts of Nash
equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.
4.1 EXPECTED PROFIT FUNCTIONS
The definitions and legal technology function specified previously allow us to explicitly identify
the expected profit function for each party when the legal dispute is to be resolved at trial.  These
expected profit functions will, of course, differ under the two alternative fee allocation rules.
Under the American rule, the expected profit for the plaintiff is given by:
EΠPA(xP ,xD,α, π) =  P(xP ,xD,α, π)A −  xP  −  CP
=  Aα
xP
xP + xD
 
  
 
   +  A(1− α )π −  xP  −  CP
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Similarly, the expected profit for the defendant under the American rule is given by:
EΠDA(xP ,xD,α, π) =  P(xP ,xD,α,π)(−A) −  xD −  CD
=  −Aα
xP
xP + xD
 
  
 
   −  A(1− α )π −  xD −  CD
Under the English rule, the expected profit for the plaintiff is given by:
EΠPE(xP, xD,α ,π ) =  P(xP ,xD,α, π )A +  (1− P(xP , xD,α ,π ))(−xP − xD) −  CP
=  A −  (A + xP + xD)(1− P(xP , xD,α ,π )) −  CP
=  A −  (A + xP + xD) α
xD
xP + xD
 
  
 
   +  (1− α )(1- π)
 
  
 
   −  CP
Similarly, the expected profit for the defendant under the English rule is given by:
EΠDE (xP ,xD,α,π ) =  P(xP ,xD,α,π )(−A − xP − xD ) −  CD
=  − (A + xP + xD) α
xP
xP + xD
 
  
 
   +  (1 − α )π
 
  
 
   −  CD
4.2 MODEL PREDICTIONS: LEGAL EXPENDITURE AT TRIAL
Proposition 1:  Under the American rule, if both parties are expected profit maximizers, the
unique Nash equilibrium levels of legal expenditure at trial are:
xP
A =  xD
A =  
Aα
4
.
Proof:  The plaintiff's objective is to
max
xP
  Aα
xP
xP + xD
 
  
 
   +  A(1 − α )π −  xP −  CP
 
  
 
  
The first order condition is
Aα
xD
A
(xP
A + xD
A)2
 
  
 
   −  1 =  0
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AαxD
A =  (xP
A
+ xD
A)2
Similarly, solving the defendant's maximization problem, we get
AαxP
A =  (xP
A + xD
A )2
Combining these equations, we have
AαxP
A =  AαxD
A
xP
A =  xD
A
and thus
AαxP
A =  (xP
A
+ xP
A )2
AαxP
A =  4xP
A 2
Aα =  4xP
A
Aα
4
 =  xP
A =  xD
A
It is easily verified that these levels of expenditure at trial do indeed maximize the associated
objective functions.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2:  Under the English rule, if both parties are expected profit maximizers, the unique
Nash equilibrium levels of legal expenditure at trial are:
xP
E =  
Aαπ
1− α
and xD
E  =  
Aα(1− π)
1− α
.
Proof:  The plaintiff's objective is to
max
xP
 A −  (A + xP + xD ) α
xD
xP + xD
 
  
 
   +  (1− α)(1- π )
 
  
 
   −  CP
 
  
 
  
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The first order condition is
(A + xP + xD)α
xD
(xP + xD)
2
 
  
 
   −  α
xD
xP + xD
 
  
 
  + (1−α )(1 −π )
 
  
 
   =  0
(A + xP + xD )αxD −  αxD(xP + xD) −  (1 −α )(1− π )(xP + xD)
2  =  0
AαxD −  (1− α)(1− π )(xP + xD )
2  =  0
AαxD
(1−α )(1 −π )
 =  (xP + xD)
2
Similarly, solving the defendant's maximization problem, we get
AαxP
(1− α )π
 =  (xP + xD )
2
Combining these equations, we have
AαxD
(1− α )(1− π)
 =  
AαxP
(1−α )π
xD =  
(1− π)xP
π
Thus,
AαxP
(1− α )π
 =  x P +
1- π( )xP
π
 
  
 
 
2
AαxP
(1− α )π
 =  
xP
2
π
2
x P  =  
Aαπ
1− α
and
xD =  
(1− π)
π
Aαπ
1 − α
     =  Aα(1− π)1 − α
It is easily verified that these levels of expenditure at trial do indeed maximize the associated
objective functions.
Q.E.D.
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As further illustration of the Nash equilibrium predictions, Figure 3 illustrates the specific point
predictions of legal expenditure at trial for the actual parameter values used in the experimental
sessions.
4.3 MODEL PREDICTIONS: FORM OF RESOLUTION
To more clearly illustrate the predictions about the form of dispute resolution, we will assume in
the following propositions that CP = CD = C.  That is, we will assume that both parties face the
same fixed costs, as is the case in the actual experimental sessions.  Allowing these fixed costs to
differ does not qualitatively change the predictions, however it adds unnecessary confusion.
We first note that in the trivial case in which C > A, the legal dispute will always be resolved with
no lawsuit being filed.  In other words, if the fixed costs of pursuing legal action exceed the
possible gain for the plaintiff, she will never file suit.  For this reason, the following propositions
also assume that C is strictly less than A.
Proposition 3:  Under the American rule, if both parties are expected profit maximizers, the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium resolutions are as follows:
(i) Settlement ⇔  π >  
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4(1 -α)
(ii) No Suit ⇔  π ≤  min  
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4(1-α )
,   
4 CA − α
4(1-α )
 
   
   
(iii) Trial ⇔  Otherwise
Proof:  Combining the expected profit functions with the equilibrium trial expenditure
predictions produces the following expected equilibrium profit functions under the American
rule:
EΠP
A(xP ,xD,α ,π ) =  Aα
xP
xP + xD
 
  
 
   +  A(1− α)π −  xP  −  C
=  Aα
1
2
     +  A(1 −α )π −  Aα4  −  C
=  A( 14 α +  π (1 −α )) −  C
14
EΠDA(xP ,xD,α, π) =  −Aα
xP
xP + xD
 
  
 
   −  A(1− α )π −  xD −  C
=  −Aα
1
2
     −  A(1 − α )π −  A
α
4
 −  C
=  −A(34 α +  π(1 − α )) −  C
Thus, the defendant strictly prefers settlement to trial if and only if
−A( 34 α +  π (1 −α )) −  C <  −A
3
4 α +  π (1− α ) +  
C
A  >  1
π (1− α ) >  1 − 34 α −
C
A
4π (1 −α ) >  4 − 3α − 4 CA
π >  
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4(1 − α)
Provided C < A, the plaintiff will always prefer settlement to no suit.  Thus, whenever the above
inequality holds, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium resolution is for the plaintiff to file suit
and for the defendant to subsequently settle.
Note that a defendant who maximizes expected utility is actually indifferent between settlement
and trial whenever π =  
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4(1− α )
.  We have chosen to define the equilibrium choice of
the
defendant to be trial in this case, but note that we could have instead said that the
defendant
chooses settlement in this knife-edge situation.  This would not change any of the substantive
predictions of the model, and would simply require switching some strict inequalities to weak
inequalities and vice versa (including changing the condition for no suit from a weak inequality to
a strict inequality).
The plaintiff weakly prefers no suit to trial if and only if
15
A( 14α +  π (1− α )) −  C ≤  0
1
4 α +  π (1− α) −  
C
A  ≤  0
π (1− α ) ≤  CA −
1
4
α
4π (1 −α ) ≤  4 CA − α
π ≤  
4 CA −α
4(1 −α )
Thus, the plaintiff prefers to not file suit whenever the defendant would not choose to settle and
the above inequality holds.  That is, the plaintiff will not file suit if and only if
π ≤  min  
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4(1 -α)
,   
4 CA −α
4(1 -α)
 
   
   
The legal dispute will obviously be resolved at trial whenever neither the conditions for
settlement nor the conditions for no suit are met.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4:  Under the English rule, if both parties are expected profit maximizers, the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium resolutions are as follows:
(i) Settlement ⇔  π >  1 − CA( )(1-α )
(ii) No Suit ⇔  π ≤  min  1− CA( )(1-α ),   CA (1-α) +α { }
(iii) Trial ⇔  Otherwise
Proof:  Combining the expected profit functions with the equilibrium trial expenditure
predictions produces the following expected equilibrium profit functions under the English rule:
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EΠPE(xP, xD,α ,π ) =  A −  (A + xP + xD) α
xD
xP + xD
 
  
 
   +  (1− α )(1- π)
 
  
 
   −  C
=  A −  A +
Aα
1 − α
    α (1 − π ) +  (1 − α )(1- π )( ) −  C
=  A −  
A
1 − α
    (1− π) −  C
=  
A − Aα − A +Aπ
1 − α
 −  C
=  
A(π − α )
1 − α
 −  C
EΠDE (xP ,xD,α,π ) =  − (A + xP + xD) α
xP
xP + xD
 
  
 
   +  (1 − α )π
 
  
 
   −  C
=  − A +
Aα
1 − α
    απ +  (1 − α)π( ) −  C
=  
−Aπ
1− α
 −  C
Thus, the defendant strictly prefers settlement to trial if and only if
−Aπ
1 − α
 −  C <  −A
π
1 − α
 +  CA  >  1
π >  (1 − CA )(1− α )
Provided C < A, the plaintiff will always prefer settlement to no suit.  Thus, whenever the above
inequality holds, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium resolution is for the plaintiff to file suit
and for the defendant to subsequently settle.
Note that a defendant who maximizes expected utility is actually indifferent between settlement
and trial whenever π =  (1− CA)(1− α ).  We have chosen to define the equilibrium choice of the
defendant to be trial in this case, but note that we could have instead said that the defendant
chooses settlement in this knife-edge situation.  This would not change any of the substantive
predictions of the model, and would simply require switching some strict inequalities to weak
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inequalities and vice versa (including changing the condition for no suit from a weak inequality to
a strict inequality).
The plaintiff weakly prefers no suit to trial if and only if
A(π −α )
1− α
 −  C ≤  0
π − α
1 −α
 −  CA  ≤  0
π ≤  CA (1 − α ) + α
Thus, the plaintiff prefers to not file suit whenever the defendant would not choose to settle and
the above inequality holds.  That is, the plaintiff will not file suit if and only if
π ≤  min  1 − CA( )(1 -α ),   CA (1 -α ) +α { }
The legal dispute will obviously be resolved at trial whenever neither the conditions for
settlement nor the conditions for no suit are met.
Q.E.D.
As further illustration of the subgame perfect equilibrium predictions, Figures 4 and 5 illustrate
the form of resolution predictions for the actual parameter values used in the experimental
sessions.
4.5 OBSERVATIONS ABOUT MODEL PREDICTIONS
Observation 1. For α∈[0,1), total equilibrium trial expenditures under the English rule are
always at least twice as large as the total equilibrium trial expenditures under the American rule:
xTotal
A  =  xP
A + xD
A  =  
Aα
4
+
Aα
4
 =  
Aα
2
xTotal
E  =  xP
E
+ xD
E  =  
Aαπ
(1− α)
+
Aα(1− π)
(1− α)
 =  
Aα
(1 − α)
0 ≤ α ≤  1 ⇒  1− α ≤  1 ⇒  1
1 −α
 ≥  1 ⇒  Aα
1− α
 ≥  Aα
Thus,  xTotal
E  ≥  2 ⋅ xTotal
A
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Observation 2. For α∈(0,1), equilibrium trial expenditure for the plaintiff is higher under the
English rule than under the American rule iff π >  
1
4
−
α
4
, while equilibrium trial expenditure for
the defendant is higher under the English rule than under the American rule iff π <  
3
4
+
α
4
:
  
π >
1
4
−
α
4
 ⇔  
π
1− α
>
1
4
 ⇔  
Aαπ
1−α
>
Aα
4
 ⇔  xP
E
> xP
A
  
π <
3
4
+
α
4
 ⇔  1 - π >
1
4
−
α
4
 ⇔  
1- π
1− α
>
1
4
 ⇔  
Aα 1 - π( )
1−α
>
Aα
4
 ⇔  xD
E
> xD
A
Note that the above observation implies that, whenever 0.25 < π < 0.50, equilibrium trial
expenditures for both the plaintiff and defendant are higher under the English rule than under the
American rule for any α∈(0,1).
Observation 3. Under both fee allocation rules with π∈(0,1), equilibrium legal expenditure at
trial increases as the productivity of lawyers increases:
∂xPA
∂α
 =  
∂xDA
∂α
 =  
A
4
 >  0
∂xPE
∂α
 =  
Aπ
(1− α )2
 >  0
∂xDE
∂α
 =  
A(1− π )
(1 −α )2
 >  0
Observation 4. Under the American rule, equilibrium legal expenditure at trial is always no
greater than one-fourth the amount of the suit:
xP
A =  xD
A =  
Aα
4
 ≤  
A
4
     ∀α ∈[0,1]
Observation 5. Under the English rule with π∈(0,1), equilibrium legal expenditure at trial
increases without bound as the productivity of lawyers increases:
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lim
α→1
 xP
E =  lim
α→1
 
Aαπ
1 − α
 =  ∞             ∀π ∈(0,1]
lim
α→1
 xD
E =  lim
α→1
 
Aα (1− π)
1− α
 =  ∞     ∀π ∈(0,1]
Observation 6. Under the American rule, equilibrium trial expenditure is independent of the
merit of the case:
∂xPA
∂π  =  
∂xDA
∂π  =  
∂
∂π
Aα
4
     =  0
Observation 7. Under the English rule with α∈(0,1), as the merit of the case increases, the
equilibrium trial expenditure of the plaintiff increases and the equilibrium trial expenditure of the
defendant decreases:
∂xPE
∂π  =  
Aα
1− α
 >  0
∂xDE
∂π  =  
−Aα
1− α
 <  0
Observation 8. In equilibrium under the English rule with α∈(0,1), (a) plaintiff expenditure at
trial is less than defendant expenditure at trial iff π<0.50, (b) plaintiff expenditure at trial is equal
to defendant expenditure at trial iff π=0.50, and (c) plaintiff expenditure at trial is greater than
defendant expenditure at trial iff π>0.50:
x P
E <  xD
E  ⇔  
Aαπ
1 − α
 <  
Aα 1− π( )
1− α
 ⇔  π <  1 − π ⇔  2π <  1 ⇔  π <  0.50
x P
E =  xD
E  ⇔  
Aαπ
1 − α
 =  
Aα 1 − π( )
1 − α
 ⇔  π =  1− π ⇔  2π =  1 ⇔  π =  0.50
x P
E >  xD
E  ⇔  
Aαπ
1 − α
 >  
Aα 1− π( )
1− α
 ⇔  π >  1 − π ⇔  2π >  1 ⇔  π >  0.50
Observation 9. Under both fee allocation rules with α∈[0,1), equilibrium trial expenditure
increases (or remains constant) as the amount of the lawsuit increases:
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∂xPA
∂A  =  
∂xDA
∂A  =  
α
4
 ≥  0
∂xPE
∂A  =  
απ
1− α
 ≥  0
∂xDE
∂A  =  
α (1 − π )
1− α
 ≥  0
Observation 10. Under both fee allocation rules, if the fixed costs are more than half the
amount of the suit CA  >  
1
2( ), no dispute will ever go to trial:
C
A  >  
1
2  ⇒  4
C
A  >  2 −α        ∀α ∈[0,1]
               ⇒  8 CA  >  4 − 2α
               ⇒  4 CA -α >  4 − 3α − 4
C
A
               ⇒  
4 CA -α
4 1 -α( )  >  
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4 1-α( )
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Therefore, in this case, the conditions of Proposition 3 become
(i) Settlement ⇔  π >  
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4(1 -α)
(ii) No Suit ⇔  π ≤  
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4(1-α )
(iii) Trial ⇔  Otherwise
Thus, all disputes result in either settlement or no suit under the American rule.
C
A  >  
1
2  ⇒  
C
A  >  
1− 2α
2(1− α )
        ∀α ∈[0,1]
               ⇒  1 − 2α <  2 CA (1− α )
               ⇒  1 − α <  2 CA (1 − α ) + α
               ⇒  1− CA( )(1− α ) <  CA (1 − α) + α
Therefore, in this case, the conditions of Proposition 4 become
(i) Settlement ⇔  π >  1 − CA( )(1-α )
(ii) No Suit ⇔  π ≤  1 − CA( )(1-α )
(iii) Trial ⇔  Otherwise
Thus, all disputes result in either settlement or no suit under the English rule as well.
Observation 11. Under the American rule, if fixed costs are sufficiently small CA  <  
α
4( ), all
legal disputes will be resolved at trial:
If CA  <  
α
4 , the conditions of Proposition 3 become
(i) Settlement ⇔  π >  
4− 3α − 4 CA
4 − 4α
 >  
4 − 4α
4 − 4α
 =  1
(ii) No Suit ⇔  π ≤  
4 CA − α
4(1− α )
 <  
α −α
4(1− α )
 =  0
(iii) Trial ⇔  Otherwise
Since 0 ≤ π ≤ 1, all disputes will be resolved at trial
Observation 12. If CA  <  
1
4 , then every dispute that would go to trial under the English rule
would also go to trial under the American rule:
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First of all, it can be shown that
C
A  <  
1
4  ⇒  (1 −
C
A )(1− α ) <  
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4(1− α )
 .
Thus, if the defendant prefers trial to settlement under the English rule, he will also
prefer trial to settlement under the American rule.  Furthermore, if we additionally
note that we only need consider cases with α <  12  (we will show below that no
cases go to trial under the English rule when α ≥  12 ), it can also be shown that
C
A  <  
1
4  ⇒  
C
A (1 − α) + α >  
4 CA − α
4(1 −α )
Thus, if the plaintiff prefers trial to settlement under the English rule, he will also
prefer trial to settlement under the American rule.  Therefore, if CA  <  
1
4 , then every
dispute that would go to trial under the English rule would also go to trial under the
American rule.
Observation 13. Under the English rule, a legal dispute will go to trial only if α < π ≤ 1−α :
Suppose that π > 1−α.  In this case, we have π >  1-α ⇒  π >  1- CA( ) 1-α( ), and
such a legal dispute would therefore result in settlement under the English rule.
Now suppose that a legal dispute does not result in settlement
i.e.  π ≤  1- CA( )1-α( )( ) and that π ≤ α.  In this case, we have
π ≤  α ⇒  π ≤  CA 1-α( )+ α  ⇒ π  ≤  min  1 − CA( )1-α( ),  CA 1 -α( )+ α { }and such a
legal dispute would therefore result in no suit being filed under the English rule.
Thus, a legal dispute will go to trial under the English rule only if α < π ≤ 1−α.
Note that the above observation also implies that, if the productivity of lawyers is greater than or
equal to one-half α ≥  12( ), no dispute will ever go to trial under the English rule.
Observation 14. Under the American rule, if the fixed costs are less than one-fourth the
amount of the suit 
C
A  <  
1
4( ), then the likelihood of trial increases (or does not change) as the
productivity of lawyers,
 α, increases:
C
A  <  
1
4  ⇒  
∂
∂α
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4(1− α)
 
  
 
  =  
1− 4 CA
16(1 −α )2
 >  0
C
A  <  
1
4  ⇒  
∂
∂α
4 CA −α
4(1− α )
 
  
 
  =  
4 CA −1
16(1−α )2
 <  0
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C
A  <  
1
4  ⇒  4
C
A  <  2− α        ∀α ∈[0,1]
               ⇒  8 CA  <  4 − 2α
               ⇒  4 CA -α <  4− 3α − 4
C
A
               ⇒  
4 CA -α
4 1-α( )  <  
4 −3α − 4 CA
4 1-α( )  
               ⇒  min
4 −3α − 4 CA
4 1-α( ) ,  
4 CA -α
4 1-α( )
   
    =  
4 CA -α
4 1-α( )
This means that the range of π values for which settlement is predicted and the range
of π values for which no suit is predicted both get smaller as α increases.  Therefore,
if CA  <  
1
4 , then as α increases, the likelihood of trial also increases.
Observation 15. Under the English rule, the likelihood of trial decreases (or does not change)
as the productivity of lawyers,
 α, increases:
Suppose that CA (1− α ) +α ≥  1-
C
A( )(1 −α ) .  In this case, all disputes result in either
settlement or no suit, so the likelihood of trial is zero for all α.  Now suppose instead
that CA (1− α ) +α <  1-
C
A( )(1 −α ) .  In this case, since C < A, we have that
∂
∂α
1− CA( )(1 −α )( ) =  CA - 1 <  0
∂
∂α
C
A (1 − α ) + α( ) =  1- CA  >  0.
This means that the range of π values for which settlement is predicted and the range
of π values for which no suit is predicted both get larger as α increases.  Therefore,
the likelihood of trial decreases as α increases.
Observation 16. Under both fee allocation rules, as the merit of the case, π, increases, the
likelihood of settlement increases and the likelihood of no suit decreases:
Under both rules, settlement occurs if π is greater than some threshold while no suit
occurs if π is less than or equal to some other threshold.  Therefore, as π increases,
the likelihood of settlement increases and the likelihood of no suit decreases.
Observation 17. Under both fee allocation rules, the likelihood of trial is greatest for closely
contested lawsuits (π =0.50):
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For any given value of π, the likelihood of trial depends upon the range of different
α values for which trial is the predicted form of resolution.  Under the American
rule, trial occurs if and only if 4
C
A -α
4 1-α( )  <  π ≤  
4− 3α − 4 CA
4 1-α( ) .
The likelihood of trial is therefore maximized when π is precisely the midpoint
between the lower and upper bounds of this inequality.  This midpoint is given by:
1
2
4 CA -α
4 1 -α( ) +
4 − 3α − 4 CA
4 1-α( )
 
  
 
   =  
4 CA -α + 4 − 3α − 4
C
A
8 1-α( )  =  
4 − 4α
8 1-α( )  =  
1
2
.
Under the English rule, trial occurs if and only if CA 1-α( )+α <  π ≤  1- CA( )1 -α( ).
The likelihood of trial is again maximized when π is equal to the midpoint between
the lower and upper bounds of this inequality.  This midpoint is given by:
1
2
C
A 1-α( )+α + 1- CA( )1-α( )( ) =  12 α + 1 -α( )( ) =  12 .
Thus, under both fee allocation rules, the likelihood of trial is highest when π =0.50.
Observation 18. There exist additional Nash equilibria which are not subgame perfect.  These
Nash equilibria are characterized by strategies off the equilibrium path in which the defendant
chooses to go to trial when he would prefer settlement or in which one party chooses a very high
level of legal expenditure at trial making trial prohibitively unattractive to the other party.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experimental results under the different parameter configurations are summarized in Figure 7
for the American rule and Figure 8 for the English rule.  For each fee allocation rule, 320
experimental legal disputes were conducted, and therefore the behavior of 640 litigants was
observed.  Not included in these numbers and not reflected in Figures 7 and 8 are the
experimental legal disputes that were conducted under the uncertain merit conditions.  The
uncertain merit experiments account for 340 additional disputes and will be discussed separately
below.
In this section we discuss the patterns of subject behavior observed in the experimental sessions
and discuss the influence of various factors on this behavior.  These experimental results are
broken into five subject areas: (1) behavior under alternative allocation rules, (2) impact of lawyer
productivity, (3) influence of case merit, (4) effect of uncertain merit, and (5) performance of
model predictions.
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5.1 BEHAVIOR UNDER ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION RULES
The first three results summarize litigant behavior under the two legal fee allocation rules.  If a
dispute is resolved at trial, the total legal expenditure at trial is greater under English rule than
under American rule (Result 1).  While the English rule does discourage trials (Result 2) this
effect is not strong enough to offset the greater expenditure.  The net effect of a move to the
English rule is to increase legal expenditure per dispute (Result 3).
Result 1. The English rule produces significantly greater legal expenditure at trial than the
American rule.
Support. Figure 9 shows that 96% of all trial expenditures under the American rule were at or
below 100 francs, 100% were at or below 200 francs, and the mean expenditure was 45 francs.
On the other hand, trial expenditures under the English rule were distributed throughout the
allowed range of 0 to 1000 francs with a mean expenditure of 580 francs, almost 13 times higher
than the mean under the American rule.  The difference in mean expenditure under the two
different rules is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Furthermore, Figures 7 and 8 indicate
that for every one of the nine combinations of α and π and for both plaintiff and defendant, mean
expenditure at trial was always at least 5.3 times larger under the English rule than under the
American rule (α=0.25, π=0.75, defendant) and was as much as 28.6 times larger (α=0.50,
π=0.75, plaintiff).
Result 2. Under the English rule, legal disputes are less likely to result in a trial than under the
American rule.
Support. Figure 10 shows that 80% of all disputes were resolved at trial under the American
rule while only 12% of all disputes were resolved at trial under the English rule.  This difference
in proportion of disputes resolved at trial under the two different rules is statistically significant at
the 1% level.  Furthermore, Figures 7 and 8 reveal that for every one of the nine combinations of
α and π, the frequency of trial was always at least 2.8 times higher under the American rule than
under the English rule (α=0.25, π=0.50).  For all nine parameter combinations, no fewer than
60% (α=0.50, π=0.25) and as many as 96% (α=0.50, π=0.50) of all disputes were resolved at trial
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under the American rule.  In contrast, no more than 34% (α=0.25, π=0.50) and as few as 0%
(α=0.50, π=0.25, and α=0.75, π=0.75) of disputes resulted in trial under the English rule.
Result 3. Total expenditure per legal dispute is higher under the English rule than under the
American rule
Support. According to the data from Figures 9 and 10, under the American rule, trial occurred
in 80.0% of all disputes and the mean expenditure at trial was 44.9 francs.  Thus, the average
expenditure at trial per person per dispute under the American rule was 35.9 francs.  If we also
include the fixed costs incurred for cases that were resolved by settlement or trial, this figure
becomes 44.3 francs.  Under the English rule, trial occurred in 12.5% of the cases and the mean
expenditure at trial was 580.2 francs.  Thus, the average expenditure at trial per person per dispute
under the English rule was 75.5 francs.  If we also include the fixed costs incurred for cases that
were resolved by settlement or trial, this figure becomes 78.7 francs, approximately 78% higher
than under the American rule.  This difference in mean expenditure per dispute under the two
different rules, with or without inclusion of the fixed costs, is statistically significant at the 1%
level.
The next three subsections explore several parameters that influence the level of expenditure and
form of resolution in a legal dispute.  The dispute parameters investigated are lawyer productivity,
case merit, and uncertainty of merit.  After the impact of these factors is discussed, the analysis
moves in subsection 4.5 to consider models that may serve as underlying explanations of the
effects of different allocation rules and dispute parameters.
5.2 IMPACT OF LAWYER PRODUCTIVITY
Result 5. Under both fee allocation rules, legal expenditure at trial increases as the
productivity of lawyers increases.  This trend is more significant under the English rule than
under the American rule.
Support. Figure 11 clearly illustrates that mean legal expenditure at trial is higher for higher
values of α under both the American and English rules.  This trend is particularly significant
under the English rule with mean expenditure jumping from 438 when α=0.25 to 630 when
α=0.50 to the expenditure ceiling of 1000 when α=0.75.  The difference in mean expenditure
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between α=0.25 and α=0.50 under the English Rule is statistically significant at the 2% level
while the difference in mean expenditure between α=0.50 and α=0.75 is statistically significant at
the 1% level.  Mean expenditure under the American rule, on the other hand, increases more
modestly from 35 to 49 to 53 for the three different levels of α.  The difference in mean
expenditure between α=0.25 and α=0.50 under the American Rule is statistically significant at the
1% level, however the difference in mean expenditure between α=0.50 and α=0.75 is not
statistically significant.
Result 5. Under both fee allocation rules, the frequency of trial decreases as the productivity
of lawyers increases.  This trend is more significant under the English rule than under the
American rule.
Support. Figure 12 illustrates the frequency of trial for various levels of α.  As α changes
from 0.25 to 0.50 to 0.75, the percentage of disputes resolved at trial under the American rule
drops from 83% to 81% to 76%, however neither of these differences in percentages are
statistically significant.  Similarly, the percentage of disputes resolved at trial under the English
rule drops from 17% to 15% to 5%.  The latter difference (between α=0.50 and α=0.75) is
statistically significant at the 1% level in this case.
5.3 INFLUENCE OF CASE MERIT
Result 6. Under both fee allocation rules, defendant expenditure at trial exceeds plaintiff
expenditure at trial for frivolous lawsuits (π=0.25) while plaintiff expenditure at trial exceeds
defendant expenditure at trial for strong lawsuits (π=0.75).  The expenditures at trial for the two
parties are most similar for closely contested lawsuits (π=0.50).
Support. Figure 13 demonstrates that under both allocation rules, mean defendant expenditure
at trial is higher than mean plaintiff expenditure at trial when π=0.25, while the opposite
relationship is true when π=0.75.  These differences in expenditure are most significant for
π=0.75 (at the 5% level under the American Rule and at the 12% level under the English Rule).
The difference between mean plaintiff and mean defendant expenditure reaches a minimum of 2
under the American rule and a minimum of 72 under the English rule, both at π=0.50.
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Result 7. Under both fee allocation rules, frivolous lawsuits (π=0.25) are the most likely to not
be filed, closely contested lawsuits (π =0.50) are the most likely to be resolved at trial, and strong
lawsuits (π =0.75) are the most likely to produce a pretrial settlement.
Support. Figure 14 illustrates the frequency of the forms of resolution for various levels of π.
Under the American rule, the frequency of no suit reaches a peak of 36% for π=0.25, the
frequency of trial reaches a peak of 89% for π=0.50, and the frequency of settlement reaches a
peak of 16% for π=0.75.  Similarly, under the English rule, the frequency of no suit reaches a
peak of 93% for π=0.25, the frequency of trial reaches a peak of 23% for π=0.50, and the
frequency of settlement reaches a peak of 88% for π=0.75.  The differences between the peak
percentage and the other percentages for each form of resolution is statistically significant at the
1% level in all but two cases and at the 5% level in all but one case (percentage of trials under the
American Rule between π=0.50 and π=0.75).
5.4 EFFECT OF UNCERTAIN MERIT
Result 8. Under both fee allocation rules, legal expenditure at trial is lower when the merit of
the lawsuit is uncertain than when the merit is known.
Support. Figure 15 indicates that under the American rule, mean expenditure at trial drops
from 44.9 to 36.5 with the addition of uncertain merit.  Figure 16 indicates that under the English
rule, mean expenditure at trial drops from 580.2 to 439.6 with the addition of uncertain merit.
Result 9. Under both fee allocation rules, the frequency of trial is higher when the merit of the
lawsuit is uncertain than when the merit is known.
Support. Figure 15 illustrates that under the American rule, the frequency of trial increases
from 80% to 85% with the addition of uncertain merit.  Figure 16 illustrates that under the
English rule, the frequency of trial increases more than two-fold from 12% to 26% with the
addition of uncertain merit.
Result 10. The difference in expenditure per dispute between the American and English rules is
greater when the merit of the lawsuit is uncertain than when the merit is known.
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Support. Calculating expenditure per person per dispute as before (see Result 3), we discover
that under the American rule, average expenditure per person per dispute decreases from 35.92 to
31.13 (44.31 to 39.94 including fixed costs) with the addition of uncertain merit.  On the other
hand, under the English rule, average expenditure per person per dispute increases from 75.53 to
113.86 (78.66 to 118.23 including fixed costs) with the addition of uncertain merit.  Thus the
difference in expenditure per dispute between the two rules increases with the addition of
uncertainty.
5.5 PERFORMANCE OF MODEL PREDICTIONS
While the general parametric influence on legal expenditure and dispute resolution is of great
interest, it is also important to explore why these factors have the influence that they do.  In
particular it is important to inquire about the reliability of game theoretic models in helping us
understand the patterns of data.  Where are they accurate and where do they tend to fail?
The first several results in this section (Result 11 through Result 17) tell us that the qualitative
predictions of the Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium models are almost always
consistent with the observed experimental behavior and outcomes.  These results suggest that
traditional game theory contributes significantly to our understanding of the relative institutional
response to changes in fee allocation rule, case merit, and lawyer productivity.  On the other hand,
the latter results of this section (Result 18 through Result 20) identify certain areas in which the
specific quantitative predictions of the game theoretic models are inconsistent with the
experimental observations.
Result 11. The direction of the difference in expenditure at trial under the two different
allocation rules is as predicted by the Nash equilibrium model.
Support. Observation 1 indicates that the Nash equilibrium model predicts, for all
experimental parameters, that legal expenditure at trial will be higher under the English rule than
under the American rule.  This prediction matches Result 1 presented above.  In addition,
Observation 1 specifically says that total expenditure at trial should always be at least twice as
large under the English rule as under the American rule.  Comparison between Figures 7 and 8
indicates that this is true for all combinations of α and π.
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Result 12. The direction of the difference in frequency of trial under the two different allocation
rules is as predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium model.
Support. For the parameters used in the experimental sessions (A=240, C=10), Observation
12 says that the subgame perfect equilibrium model predicts that the frequency of trial will be
lower under the English rule than under the American rule.  This prediction matches Result 2
presented above.
Result 13. For almost all parameter combinations, the most frequently observed form of
resolution is the form predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium model.
Support. Figure 5 illustrates the form of resolution predicted by the subgame perfect
equilibrium model under the American rule for the particular values used in the experimental
sessions (A=240, C=10).  This figure shows that trial is the predicted form of resolution under the
American rule for all nine combinations of α and π used in the experiments.  Comparing this
prediction with the experimental results in Figure 7 reveals that trial is, in fact, the most
frequently observed form of resolution under the American rule for all parameter combinations.
For the English rule, the crosses in Figure 6 illustrate the forms of resolution predicted by the
subgame perfect equilibrium model for the nine combinations of α and π used in the experiments.
Comparing these predictions with the experimental results in Figure 8 reveals that the most
frequently observed form of resolution matches the predicted form of resolution for seven of the
nine combinations of α and π.  Combining the results from both rules, the most frequently
observed form of resolution matches the predicted form of resolution in 16 out of the 18 different
parameter combinations (three levels of α, three levels of π, and two different allocation rules).
Result 14. Under both fee allocation rules, the effect of changes in the productivity of lawyers
on legal expenditure at trial is as predicted by the Nash equilibrium model.
Support. Under both fee allocation rules, Observation 3 says that the Nash equilibrium model
predicts that legal expenditure at trial will increase as the productivity of lawyers increases.  This
prediction matches Result 4 presented above.  Moreover, Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that the
Nash model predicts that the increase in legal expenditure as a response to an increase in lawyer
productivity will be more significant under the English rule than under the American rule.  This
prediction is also verified by Result 4 above.
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Result 15. Under the English rule, the effect of changes in the productivity of lawyers on the
frequency trial is as predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium model.
Support. Observation 15 indicates that, under the English rule, the subgame perfect
equilibrium model predicts that the frequency of trial will decrease as the productivity of lawyers
increases.  This prediction coincides with Result 5 presented above.
Result 16. Under the English rule, the effect of changes in case merit on legal expenditure at
trial is as predicted by the Nash equilibrium model.
Support. According to Observations 7 and 8, the Nash equilibrium model predicts that (a)
defendant expenditure at trial will exceed plaintiff expenditure at trial when π=0.25, (b) plaintiff
expenditure at trial will exceed defendant expenditure at trial when π=0.75, and (c) the difference
between plaintiff and defendant expenditure at trial should be smallest for π=0.50.  All three of
these predictions are verified by Result 6 above.
Result 17. Under both fee allocation rules, the effect of changes in case merit on the frequency
of suit, settlement, and trial is as predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium model.
Support. According to Observations 16 and 17, the subgame perfect equilibrium model
predicts that, under both allocation rules, frivolous lawsuits (π=0.25) will be the most likely to not
be filed, closely contested lawsuits (π=0.50) will be the most likely to be resolved at trial, and
strong lawsuits (π=0.75) will be the most likely to produce a pretrial settlement.  This prediction
coincides with Result 7 presented above.
Result 18. Under the American rule, average legal expenditure at trial is slightly higher than
predicted by the Nash equilibrium model.  Under the English rule, average legal expenditure at
trial is much higher than predicted by the Nash equilibrium model
Support. Figure 17 shows that for all values of α, the observed average expenditure at trial
under both allocation rules is above the level of expenditure predicted by the Nash equilibrium
model.  This figure also illustrates that the difference between observed and predicted expenditure
at trial is much more significant under the English rule than under the American rule (note the
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different scales for the vertical axes in the figure).  In addition, comparison of predicted
expenditure levels in Figures 3 and 4 to observed expenditure levels in Figures 7 and 8 allow
examination of differences for all nine combinations of α and π.  Under the American rule,
observed expenditure at trial ranges from 10% below prediction (α=0.50, π=0.75, defendant) to
220% above prediction (α=0.25, π=0.50, plaintiff).  Under the English rule, observed expenditure
at trial ranges from 85% above prediction (α=0.75, π=0.25, defendant) to 1415% above
prediction (α=0.25, π=0.50, defendant).  All differences between observed and predicted
expenditure levels are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Result 19. Under  the American rule, the frequency of trial is lower than predicted by the
subgame perfect equilibrium model.
Support. Figure 18 illustrates that the subgame perfect equilibrium model predicts 100% of
legal disputes will go to trial under the American rule for the particular parameter values used in
the experimental sessions.  This figure also shows, however, that only 80% of all experimental
disputes are actually resolved at trial.  Moreover, Figure 7 indicates that, for particular
combinations of α and π, as few as 60% of disputes are resolved at trial under the American rule.
Result 20. Under the English rule, the frequency of no suit is higher than predicted by the
subgame perfect equilibrium model while the frequency of settlement is lower than predicted.
Support. As illustrated in Figure 19, the subgame perfect equilibrium model predicts that,
under the English rule, 21% of all disputes will result in no suit being filed, 67% will result in
pretrial settlement, and 12% will proceed to trial (note that these percentages are determined by
the observed relative frequency of the different combinations of α and π in the experimental
sessions).  Figure 19 also depicts the observed frequency of the different forms of resolution, and
although the observed frequency of trial (12%) matches the prediction, the observed frequency of
no suit (50%) is significantly greater than predicted while the observed frequency of settlement
(38%) is significantly lower than predicted.  Comparing predictions and observations for specific
parameter values reveals that much of the overall discrepancy can be traced to two specific
parameter combinations: α=0.75, π=0.25, and α=0.75, π=0.50.  Figure 6 illustrates that
settlement is the predicted form of resolution under both of these parameter combinations,
however in both cases, Figure 8 reveals that the most frequently observed resolution is no suit
being filed (90% and 67% of disputes), with settlement occurring much less frequently (0% and
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37% of disputes).  Note that both litigants prefer to avoid trial under these parameter
combinations, however the subgame perfect equilibrium model predicts that the plaintiff will file
suit with the knowledge (or belief) that the defendant will subsequently choose to settle rather
than go to trial.  In the actual experiments, however, many plaintiffs are choosing not to file suit,
apparently because they fear that the defendants will “call their bluff” and proceed to trial.
6 EX-POST THEORIZING AND CONJECTURES
The analysis in this paper provides important insight into the impact of alternative legal fee
allocation rules on the behavior of litigants and the resolution of legal disputes.  Nonetheless,
there remain relevant unanswered questions and significant avenues for further research in the
field.  In this section, we present rudimentary theories on several issues that are raised or
unaddressed by our analysis and discuss potential research extensions that are outside the scope of
the present paper.
As mentioned previously, a comprehensive investigation of different fee allocation rules requires
examination of all four stages in the chronology of a legal dispute (Figure 1), recognizing that
behavior in each preliminary stage will depend heavily upon expectations about the outcome of
later stages.  The present paper is intended to be a first step in such an investigation, and therefore
focuses primarily on the different effects of the American and English rules on outcomes and
decisions at trial, the final stage in the chronology.  Other researchers may seek to extend our
analysis to the previous stage of settlement bargaining, and in doing so may employ a more
flexible settlement procedure than the strict forfeiture settlement mechanism used in our
investigation.  It is therefore sensible to discuss the anticipated effects of alternative settlement
mechanisms on the results of this paper.
It is reasonable to expect that a more flexible settlement mechanism could produce additional
settlements and fewer trials than were predicted and observed in the present analysis.  Recall that
the forfeiture settlement mechanism we employed was chosen with the expectation that the
number of disputes resolved at trial would be significant enough for us to draw strong conclusions
about trial expenditure decisions.  In our experiments, more than 90% of the lawsuits filed under
the American rule were resolved at trial, whereas fewer than 10% of all lawsuits proceed to trial
in actual practice.  Therefore, any settlement mechanism that is selected to more closely represent
existing legal procedure should result in a greater number of lawsuits being settled out of court.
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Despite the prospect of increasing the settlement rate, use of an alternative mechanism is
nevertheless unlikely to reverse any of the results comparing litigant behavior under the two
different allocation rules.  For example, trial expenditure should continue to be higher under the
English rule than under the American rule (Result 1), since the settlement mechanism has no
effect on incentives at trial (although it may influence the type of disputes that proceed to trial).
Moreover, as long as this disparity in trial expenditure persists, there will be a greater incentive to
settle and therefore a lower frequency of trial under the English rule than under the American rule
(Result 2).
We also expect that expenditure per legal dispute would continue to be higher under the English
rule than under the American rule (Result 3) for any reasonable settlement mechanism.  Given
that the observed expenditure per trial under the English rule was 13 times higher than under the
American rule, adoption of an alternative settlement mechanism would reverse our result only if
the new mechanism produced 13 trials under the American rule for every single trial under the
English rule.  No matter the settlement procedure, such a significant difference in trial rates is
highly unlikely and inconsistent with empirical evidence [Hughes and Snyder 1991, 1995].
Another potential research extension is the enhancement of the game theoretic models to explain
the discrepancies between predicted behavior and experimental observations.  The models
presented in this paper are remarkably effective in terms of predicting the qualitative behavioral
impact of changes in fee allocation rule, case merit, and lawyer productivity.  Nonetheless, there
are experimental treatments in which the observed form of resolution and/or level of legal
expenditure differs significantly from the model predictions.
First of all, it is possible that a model of litigant behavior containing an element of randomness or
imperfect performance may explain some of the observed actions and outcomes that are
inconsistent with the traditional game theoretic model.  Introducing small errors in performance
could account for cases in which observed litigant behavior does not differ substantially from the
prediction.  For example, although the observed form of resolution is most frequently the form
predicted, we still observe dispute resolutions that are zero likelihood events according to the
model.  With the introduction of randomness or error, this zero likelihood problem is immediately
averted as all possible outcomes become positive probability events.
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In addition, the results of the uncertain merit experiments suggest that a model incorporating
uncertain or asymmetric information may also have considerable explanatory power.  As
previously discussed, the addition of uncertain merit increases the frequency of trial, especially
under the English rule.  Information uncertainty therefore presents itself as a potential explanation
for the occurrence of trials (with frequencies as high as 28%) under the English rule in treatments
for which settlement or no suit is the predicted resolution.  In particular, a litigant may be
uncertain about the interpretation of the dispute process, about the assessment of the probability
of prevailing at trial, or about the opposing parties beliefs about these same factors.
Lastly, anomalous litigant behavior may also be a result of non-neutral attitudes toward risk.  In
particular, consider the most dramatic inaccuracy of the current game theoretic model, which is
the significant underestimation of legal expenditure at trial under the English rule.  In these
disputes, the equilibrium expected profit at trial is always negative for the defendant and is
negative for the plaintiff in six of nine treatments.  Since trial is a negative value gamble for both
parties in such cases, prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky 1979] predicts risk seeking
behavior by the litigants, making them more inclined to take the greater gamble associated with
larger trial expenditures.  Such risk attitudes may therefore explain why observed expenditure at
trial under the English rule is significantly higher than the current model predicts for risk neutral
parties.  In addition, it is possible that non-neutral risk attitudes may be the rationale for other
observed behavior that is inconsistent with the game theoretic models as currently constructed.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of legal fee allocation rules presented in this paper suggests that a change from the
American rule to the English rule could result in extreme changes in the legal process.  The
experimental results as well as the game theoretic model applied to the legal dispute environment
under investigation indicate significant differences in the level of legal expenditures and the
frequency of suit, settlement, and trial induced by the two rules.
In the experimental legal environment, subjects chose levels of expenditure at trial under the
English rule which were on average almost 13 times larger than the levels of expenditure at trial
chosen under the American rule.  On the other hand, nearly 6 times fewer legal disputes were
brought to trial under the English rule than under the American rule.  Despite the lower frequency
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of trial under the English rule, total expenditure per dispute was 78% higher under the English
rule than under the American rule.
These results indicate that while a move to the English rule may reduce the number of lawsuits
and trials in our legal system, it may nevertheless increase the total cost of the system as a result
of dramatically increased expenditure at trial.  The surprisingly high legal fees that must be paid
by a losing party under the English rule also raises significant issues concerning proper access to
justice.  Parties with meritorious claims may be deterred from going to trial or even using the
legal system at all when the potential costs are so high.  It is a fundamental premise of our legal
system that every citizen is entitled to her day in court, and relieving court congestion may not be
justified if, as a consequence, potential litigants are afraid to exercise their legal rights.
In addition to the qualitative differences between the American rule and English rule, we were
also able to identify the impact of several other factors on litigation expenditure and dispute
resolution.  The productivity of lawyers was shown to be positively related to legal expenditure at
trial and negatively related to the frequency of trial.  Case merit was also found to have significant
effects, with frivolous lawsuits being the most likely to not be filed, closely contested lawsuits the
most likely to be resolved at trial, and strong lawsuits the most likely to produce a pretrial
settlement.  In addition, defendants outspent plaintiffs on average when frivolous lawsuits were
resolved at trial while plaintiffs outspent defendants on average when strong lawsuits were
resolved at trial.  Finally, the effect of uncertain merit was to decrease expenditure at trial,
increase the frequency of trial, and increase the gap between the American rule and English rule
in terms of expenditure per dispute.
The Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium models provide accurate predictions
regarding the qualitative differences between the American and English rules as well as the
impact of changes in lawyer productivity and case merit.  Nonetheless, the specific quantitative
predictions were not always accurate, with the most dramatic discrepancy being a significant
underestimation of the level of legal expenditure at trial under the English rule.  Directions for
future research include enhancements to the current models that may explain such discrepancies,
perhaps incorporating errors in performance, uncertain or asymmetric information, or non-neutral
attitudes toward risk.
Figure 1
Chronology of a Legal Dispute
Stage 1: Harm
An event occurs in which one individual or entity allegedly harms
another.
Stage 2: Assertion of Legal Claim
The individual that allegedly was harmed chooses whether or not
to assert a legal claim.
Stage 3: Settlement Bargaining
The individuals involved participate in pretrial procedures and
attempt to settle the dispute through private bargaining.
Stage 4: Trial
The individuals, represented by lawyers, present their argument to
the court, which subsequently dictates a resolution of the dispute.
Figure 2
Structure of Experimental Legal Dispute
Experimenter Action:
Assign Dispute Parameters
Plaintiff Decision:
File Suit or Not File Suit
Defendant Decision:
Settle or Not Settle
Plaintiff & Defendant Decision:
Level of Legal Expenditure
Experimenter Action:
Reveal Dispute Parameters
Dispute Resolution:
No Suit
Experimenter Action:
Calculate Verdict
Dispute Resolution:
Settlement
Dispute Resolution:
Trial
Dispute Resolution:
Trial
Not File Suit
Settle
Plaintiff Wins
Defendant Wins
File Suit
Not Settle
Figure 3
Predicted Expenditure At Trial Under American Rule (A=240, C=10)
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π
0.25 0.50 0.75
PLAINTIFF: 15 PLAINTIFF: 15 PLAINTIFF: 15
0.25 DEFENDANT: 15 DEFENDANT: 15 DEFENDANT: 15
TOTAL 30 TOTAL 30 TOTAL 30
PLAINTIFF: 30 PLAINTIFF: 30 PLAINTIFF: 30
α 0.50 DEFENDANT: 30 DEFENDANT: 30 DEFENDANT: 30
TOTAL 60 TOTAL 60 TOTAL 60
PLAINTIFF: 45 PLAINTIFF: 45 PLAINTIFF: 45
0.75 DEFENDANT: 45 DEFENDANT: 45 DEFENDANT: 45
TOTAL 90 TOTAL 90 TOTAL 90
Figure 4
Predicted Expenditure At Trial Under English Rule (A=240, C=10)
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π
0.25 0.50 0.75
PLAINTIFF: 20 PLAINTIFF: 40 PLAINTIFF: 60
0.25 DEFENDANT: 60 DEFENDANT: 40 DEFENDANT: 20
TOTAL 80 TOTAL 80 TOTAL 80
PLAINTIFF: 60 PLAINTIFF: 120 PLAINTIFF: 180
α 0.50 DEFENDANT: 180 DEFENDANT: 120 DEFENDANT: 60
TOTAL 240 TOTAL 240 TOTAL 240
PLAINTIFF: 180 PLAINTIFF: 360 PLAINTIFF: 540
0.75 DEFENDANT: 540 DEFENDANT: 360 DEFENDANT: 180
TOTAL 720 TOTAL 720 TOTAL 720
Figure 5
Predicted Form of Resolution Under American Rule (A=240, C=10)
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Figure 6
Predicted Form of Resolution Under English Rule (A=240, C=10)
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Figure 7
Experimental Results Under American Rule
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0.25 FORM OF RESOLUTION FORM OF RESOLUTION FORM OF RESOLUTION
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Figure 8
Experimental Results Under English Rule
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π
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  MEAN EXPENDITURE   MEAN EXPENDITURE   MEAN EXPENDITURE
PLAINTIFF 295 PLAINTIFF 378 PLAINTIFF 377
DEFENDANT 510 DEFENDANT 606 DEFENDANT 123
0.25 FORM OF RESOLUTION FORM OF RESOLUTION FORM OF RESOLUTION
NO SUIT 90% NO SUIT 53% NO SUIT 10%
SETTLEMENT 0% SETTLEMENT 13% SETTLEMENT 83%
TRIAL 10% TRIAL 34% TRIAL 7%
  MEAN EXPENDITURE   MEAN EXPENDITURE   MEAN EXPENDITURE
PLAINTIFF - PLAINTIFF 635 PLAINTIFF 1000
DEFENDANT - DEFENDANT 557 DEFENDANT 700
α 0.50 FORM OF RESOLUTION FORM OF RESOLUTION FORM OF RESOLUTION
NO SUIT 100% NO SUIT 32% NO SUIT 4%
SETTLEMENT 0% SETTLEMENT 40% SETTLEMENT 89%
TRIAL 0% TRIAL 28% TRIAL 7%
  MEAN EXPENDITURE   MEAN EXPENDITURE   MEAN EXPENDITURE
PLAINTIFF 1000 PLAINTIFF 1000 PLAINTIFF -
DEFENDANT 1000 DEFENDANT 1000 DEFENDANT -
0.75 FORM OF RESOLUTION FORM OF RESOLUTION FORM OF RESOLUTION
NO SUIT 90% NO SUIT 60% NO SUIT 4%
SETTLEMENT 0% SETTLEMENT 37% SETTLEMENT 96%
TRIAL 10% TRIAL 3% TRIAL 0%
Figure 9
Expenditure at Trial Under Alternative Allocation Rules
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Figure 10
Form of Resolution Under Alternative Allocation Rules
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Figure 11
Expenditure at Trial as a Function of Lawyer Productivity
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Figure 12
Form of Resolution as a Function of Lawyer Productivity
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Figure 13
Expenditure at Trial as a Function of Case Merit
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Figure 14
Form of Resolution as a Function of Case Merit
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Figure 15
Known Merit vs. Uncertain Merit Under the American Rule
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Figure 16
Known Merit vs. Uncertain Merit Under the English Rule
Known Merit Uncertain Merit
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Figure 17
Predicted vs. Observed Expenditure at Trial
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Figure 18
Predicted vs. Observed Form of Resolution Under the American Rule
Predicted Observed
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Figure 19
Predicted vs. Observed Form of Resolution Under the English Rule
Predicted Observed
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1APPENDIX: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in market decision making.  If you follow the instructions carefully and
make good decisions, you may earn money which will be paid to you in cash.
The currency used in this experiment is francs.  Each franc is worth ____ dollars to you.
The experiment will consist of several periods.  At the beginning of each period, every
participant in the experiment will be randomly paired with another participant.  In each period,
you are equally likely to be paired with any other participant and the identity of the person you
are paired with will never be revealed to you.
One member of each pair will randomly be designated as Person A, and the other member will be
designated as Person B.  In addition, each pair will randomly be assigned a State.  The three
possible states are "X", "Y", and "Z", and they each occur with equal probability.  You will not
know which State your pair has been assigned until the end of the period.
After each pair has been assigned a State, Person A and Person B will each receive a Signal.  The
Signal Person A receives is known as Signal A and the Signal Person B receives is known as
Signal B.  The three possible Signals are "X", "Y", and "Z".  The probability of receiving each
Signal will depend on which State the pair has been assigned.  The following chart identifies the
probability of receiving each Signal, "X", "Y", or "Z", as a function of the State, "X", "Y", or "Z",
which has been assigned to the pair:
STATE SIGNAL
X Y Z
X 60% 20% 20%
Y 20% 60% 20%
Z 20% 20% 60%
In other words, each person has a 60% chance of receiving the Signal which matches the State
the pair has been assigned, and a 20% chance of receiving each of the other two signals.  For
every pair, Person A and Person B will each be assigned a Signal according to the above
probabilities.  Thus, Person A and Person B could receive the same Signal or they could receive
different Signals.
2At the start of each period, the first thing you will see on the computer screen will be an
identification of which Person you are and which Signal you have received.  For example, if you
are Person A and you have received Signal X, the computer screen will read: "You are Person A
in group, your Signal is X."
Each participant will receive a Capital Payment  of 400 francs at the beginning of each period.
During the rest of the period, participants will make decisions that affect their Period Payoff .
Each participant's final Period Profit or Loss  will be the 400 franc Capital Payment plus or
minus this Period Payoff.
Each period will consist of two stages:
Stage 1
At the beginning of Stage 1, Person A in each group will be asked: "Do you want to continue
(Y/N)?".  Person A can answer this question by pressing either "Y" or "N" on his or her
keyboard.
If Person A chooses "N", the period ends for that pair.  Both Person A and Person B will receive
a Period Payoff of 0 francs.  Therefore, they each will have a Period Profit of 400 francs ( the
Capital Payment of 400 francs plus the Period Payoff of 0 francs ).
If Person A chooses "Y", he or she will pay a Fee  of 10 francs for choosing to continue, and
Person B is then asked the same question, "Do you want to continue (Y/N)?".
If Person B then chooses "N", Person B gives Person A a Transfer  of 240 francs and the period
ends for that pair.  Thus, Person A will receive a Period Payoff of 230 francs ( the Transfer of
240 francs minus the Fee of 10 francs ) and Person B will receive a Period Payoff of -240 francs.
The Period Profits for this pair will be 630 francs and 160 francs respectively.
If Person B chooses "Y", he or she will also pay a fee of 10 francs for choosing to continue, and
the period proceeds to Stage 2.
3Stage 2
During Stage 2, Person A and Person B will make Investment  decisions which will affect the
likelihood of two possible outcomes:  Outcome A  and Outcome B.
Under Outcome A, Person B will give Person A a Transfer of 240 francs.  Under Outcome B, no
transfer takes place.
At the beginning of stage 2, each person is asked "Please enter your level of investment followed
by the [F1] key to send."  At this point each person will enter the amount of francs he or she
wants to invest to affect the likelihood of Outcome A and Outcome B.  The amount Person A
invests is known as Investment A  and the amount Person B invests is known as Investment B.
Each person may enter any amount between 0 and 1000 (Note: You may invest more than your
Capital Payment of 400 francs and you may also invest as little as 0 francs).  After the amount is
entered, you must press the F1 key to tell the computer you are ready.
The exact manner in which Investment A and Investment B affect the likelihood of Outcome A
and Outcome B will be discussed in the final section of the instructions.
Calculating Profits and/or Losses
After stage 1 and stage 2 have been completed, and outcomes are calculated for each pair, every
participant will be notified of the final results for his or her pair.  For example, if you are Person
B and you received Signal Z, at the end of the period your computer screen might read:
Period Ended.      State:  X,   Outcome:  A
You: B Other: A
Signal: Z X
Invest: 60 30
Payoff: -310 200
In the above case, the State was X, Person A received Signal X, and Person B received Signal Z.
Both Person A and Person B chose to continue in Stage 1, Person B chose to invest 60 in Stage 2,
and Person A chose to invest 30 in Stage 2.  Since the outcome was Outcome A, Person B's
Period Payoff is -310 (the Transfer of 240, the Investment of 60, and the Fee for continuing of
10) and Person A's payoff is 200 (the Transfer of 240 minus the Investment of 30 and the Fee of
10).
4Period payoffs can be summarized by the following table:
Stage 1 Decisions Outcome Period Payoffs
Person A Person B Person A Person B
N - - 0 0
Y N - 230 -240
Y Y A 230 - Investment A -250 - Investment B
Y Y B -10 - Investment A -10 - Investment B
At the end of each period, participants should fill out all of the columns of information on the
Profit / Loss Record sheet and calculate their Period Profit or Loss by adding their Period Payoff
to their Capital Payment of 400 francs.
Determining the Outcome of Stage 2 for Each Pair
The outcome of Stage 2 for each pair will be determined by a single draw from a computerized
urn.  The exact make-up of the urn will be determined by the investment decisions of the two
individuals.
The urn is filled with 1000 balls.  The first 500 balls will be divided proportionately between
Person A and Person B based on the amount of francs each person has chosen to invest.  In other
words:
Investment A
Number of Balls assigned to Person A =   ---------------------------------------  ×  500
Investment A + Investment B
Investment B
Number of Balls assigned to Person B =   ---------------------------------------  ×  500
Investment A + Investment B
To better understand this, here are a few examples:
Investment A Investment B Balls Assigned to Person A Balls Assigned to Person B
75 75 250 250
20 30 200 300
120 30 400 100
0 5 0 500
0 0 250 250
5The assignment of the remaining 500 balls will be determined by the state, "X", "Y", or "Z".  The
following chart summarizes the assignment of these 500 balls:
STATE NUMBER OF BALLS
ASSIGNED TO PERSON A
NUMBER OF BALLS
ASSIGNED TO PERSON B
X 125 375
Y 250 250
Z 375 125
After all 1000 balls have been assigned, a single ball is drawn from the urn.  If the ball belongs to
Person A, then Outcome A occurs and Person B transfers 240 francs to Person A.  If the ball
belongs to Person B, then Outcome B occurs and no transfer takes place.
To help you better understand how the 1000 balls are assigned, you have been provided three
sheets labeled "Probability of Outcome A as a Function of Investment A and Investment B."
Each sheet is also labelled either "STATE X", "STATE Y", or "STATE Z."  These sheets each
contain a chart which indicates the probability of Outcome A (or percentage of balls assigned to
Person A) for combinations of Investment A and Investment B.
After examining the charts on these three sheets, please note the following observations:
(1) For a given amount of investment by Person B, the more Person A invests, the more likely
Outcome A is and the less likely Outcome B is.   Similiarly, for a given amount of investment
by Person A, the more Person B invests, the more likely Outcome B is and the less likely
Outcome A is.
(2) For any given combination of Investment A and Investment B, Outcome A is most likely in
State Z and least likely in State X.
(3)  In state X, no matter how much Person A invests, there is always at least a 37.5% chance of
Outcome B.  No matter how much Person B invests, there is always at least a 12.5% chance
of Outcome A.
Similarly, in state Y, there is always at least a 25% chance of Outcome B and there is always
at least a 25% chance of Outcome A.
In state Z, there is always at least a 12.5% chance of Outcome B and there is always at least a
37.5%  chance of Outcome A.
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Probability of Outcome A as a Function of Investment A and Investment B
S  T  A  T  E      X
I  N  V  E  S  T  M  E  N  T    B
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250
0 38 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
10 63 38 29 25 23 21 20 19 18 18 17 17 16 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14
20 63 46 38 33 29 27 25 24 23 22 21 20 20 19 19 18 18 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 16 16
30 63 50 43 38 34 31 29 28 26 25 24 23 23 22 21 21 20 20 20 19 19 19 19 18 18 18
40 63 53 46 41 38 35 33 31 29 28 27 26 25 24 24 23 23 22 22 21 21 21 20 20 20 19
50 63 54 48 44 40 38 35 33 32 30 29 28 27 26 26 25 24 24 23 23 23 22 22 21 21 21
I 60 63 55 50 46 43 40 38 36 34 33 31 30 29 28 28 27 26 26 25 25 24 24 23 23 23 22
N 70 63 56 51 48 44 42 39 38 36 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 28 27 27 26 25 25 25 24 24 23
V 80 63 57 53 49 46 43 41 39 38 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 29 28 27 27 26 26 25 25 25
E 90 63 58 53 50 47 45 43 41 39 38 36 35 34 33 32 31 31 30 29 29 28 28 27 27 26 26
S 100 63 58 54 51 48 46 44 42 40 39 38 36 35 34 33 33 32 31 30 30 29 29 28 28 27 27
T 110 63 58 55 52 49 47 45 43 41 40 39 38 36 35 35 34 33 32 31 31 30 30 29 29 28 28
M 120 63 59 55 53 50 48 46 44 43 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 33 32 31 31 30 30 29 29
E 130 63 59 56 53 51 49 47 45 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 33 32 32 31 31 30 30
N 140 63 59 56 54 51 49 48 46 44 43 42 41 39 38 38 37 36 35 34 34 33 33 32 31 31 30
T 150 63 59 57 54 52 50 48 47 45 44 43 41 40 39 38 38 37 36 35 35 34 33 33 32 32 31
160 63 60 57 55 53 51 49 47 46 45 43 42 41 40 39 38 38 37 36 35 35 34 34 33 33 32
A 170 63 60 57 55 53 51 49 48 47 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 38 37 36 35 35 34 34 33 33
180 63 60 58 55 53 52 50 49 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 38 37 36 36 35 34 34 33
190 63 60 58 56 54 52 51 49 48 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 40 39 38 38 37 36 36 35 35 34
200 63 60 58 56 54 53 51 50 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 40 39 38 38 37 36 36 35 35
210 63 60 58 56 55 53 51 50 49 48 46 45 44 43 43 42 41 40 39 39 38 38 37 36 36 35
220 63 60 58 57 55 53 52 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 41 40 39 39 38 38 37 36 36
230 63 60 59 57 55 54 52 51 50 48 47 46 45 44 44 43 42 41 41 40 39 39 38 38 37 36
240 63 61 59 57 55 54 53 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 43 42 41 40 40 39 39 38 38 37
250 63 61 59 57 56 54 53 52 50 49 48 47 46 45 45 44 43 42 42 41 40 40 39 39 38 38
 Prob(A) > 60  40 <= Prob(A) <= 60  Prob(A) < 40
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Probability of Outcome A as a Function of Investment A and Investment B
S  T  A  T  E      Y
I  N  V  E  S  T  M  E  N  T    B
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250
0 50 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
10 75 50 42 38 35 33 32 31 31 30 30 29 29 29 28 28 28 28 28 28 27 27 27 27 27 27
20 75 58 50 45 42 39 38 36 35 34 33 33 32 32 31 31 31 30 30 30 30 29 29 29 29 29
30 75 63 55 50 46 44 42 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 34 33 33 33 32 32 32 31 31 31 31 30
40 75 65 58 54 50 47 45 43 42 40 39 38 38 37 36 36 35 35 34 34 33 33 33 32 32 32
50 75 67 61 56 53 50 48 46 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 38 37 36 36 35 35 35 34 34 34 33
I 60 75 68 63 58 55 52 50 48 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 39 38 38 37 37 36 36 35 35 35
N 70 75 69 64 60 57 54 52 50 48 47 46 44 43 43 42 41 40 40 39 38 38 38 37 37 36 36
V 80 75 69 65 61 58 56 54 52 50 49 47 46 45 44 43 42 42 41 40 40 39 39 38 38 38 37
E 90 75 70 66 63 60 57 55 53 51 50 49 48 46 45 45 44 43 42 42 41 41 40 40 39 39 38
S 100 75 70 67 63 61 58 56 54 53 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 44 43 42 42 41 41 40 40 39
T 110 75 71 67 64 62 59 57 56 54 53 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 45 44 43 43 42 42 41 41 40
M 120 75 71 68 65 63 60 58 57 55 54 52 51 50 49 48 47 46 46 45 44 44 43 43 42 42 41
E 130 75 71 68 66 63 61 59 58 56 55 53 52 51 50 49 48 47 47 46 45 45 44 44 43 43 42
N 140 75 72 69 66 64 62 60 58 57 55 54 53 52 51 50 49 48 48 47 46 46 45 44 44 43 43
T 150 75 72 69 67 64 63 61 59 58 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 49 48 48 47 46 46 45 45 44 44
160 75 72 69 67 65 63 61 60 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 49 49 48 47 47 46 46 45 45
A 170 75 72 70 68 65 64 62 60 59 58 56 55 54 53 52 52 51 50 49 49 48 47 47 46 46 45
180 75 72 70 68 66 64 63 61 60 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 51 50 49 49 48 48 47 46 46
190 75 73 70 68 66 65 63 62 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 51 50 49 49 48 48 47 47
200 75 73 70 68 67 65 63 62 61 59 58 57 56 55 54 54 53 52 51 51 50 49 49 48 48 47
210 75 73 71 69 67 65 64 63 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 53 52 51 51 50 49 49 48 48
220 75 73 71 69 67 66 64 63 62 60 59 58 57 56 56 55 54 53 53 52 51 51 50 49 49 48
230 75 73 71 69 68 66 65 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 54 53 52 52 51 51 50 49 49
240 75 73 71 69 68 66 65 64 63 61 60 59 58 57 57 56 55 54 54 53 52 52 51 51 50 49
250 75 73 71 70 68 67 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 55 54 53 53 52 52 51 51 50
 Prob(A) > 60  40 <= Prob(A) <= 60  Prob(A) < 40
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Probability of Outcome A as a Function of Investment A and Investment B
S  T  A  T  E     Z
I  N  V  E  S  T  M  E  N  T    B
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250
0 63 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
10 88 63 54 50 48 46 45 44 43 43 42 42 41 41 41 41 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 39
20 88 71 63 58 54 52 50 49 48 47 46 45 45 44 44 43 43 43 43 42 42 42 42 42 41 41
30 88 75 68 63 59 56 54 53 51 50 49 48 48 47 46 46 45 45 45 44 44 44 44 43 43 43
40 88 78 71 66 63 60 58 56 54 53 52 51 50 49 49 48 48 47 47 46 46 46 45 45 45 44
50 88 79 73 69 65 63 60 58 57 55 54 53 52 51 51 50 49 49 48 48 48 47 47 46 46 46
I 60 88 80 75 71 68 65 63 61 59 58 56 55 54 53 53 52 51 51 50 50 49 49 48 48 48 47
N 70 88 81 76 73 69 67 64 63 61 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 53 52 52 51 50 50 50 49 49 48
V 80 88 82 78 74 71 68 66 64 63 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 54 53 52 52 51 51 50 50 50
E 90 88 83 78 75 72 70 68 66 64 63 61 60 59 58 57 56 56 55 54 54 53 53 52 52 51 51
S 100 88 83 79 76 73 71 69 67 65 64 63 61 60 59 58 58 57 56 55 55 54 54 53 53 52 52
T 110 88 83 80 77 74 72 70 68 66 65 64 63 61 60 60 59 58 57 56 56 55 55 54 54 53 53
M 120 88 84 80 78 75 73 71 69 68 66 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 58 57 56 56 55 55 54 54
E 130 88 84 81 78 76 74 72 70 68 67 66 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 58 57 57 56 56 55 55
N 140 88 84 81 79 76 74 73 71 69 68 67 66 64 63 63 62 61 60 59 59 58 58 57 56 56 55
T 150 88 84 82 79 77 75 73 72 70 69 68 66 65 64 63 63 62 61 60 60 59 58 58 57 57 56
160 88 85 82 80 78 76 74 72 71 70 68 67 66 65 64 63 63 62 61 60 60 59 59 58 58 57
A 170 88 85 82 80 78 76 74 73 72 70 69 68 67 66 65 64 63 63 62 61 60 60 59 59 58 58
180 88 85 83 80 78 77 75 74 72 71 70 69 68 67 66 65 64 63 63 62 61 61 60 59 59 58
190 88 85 83 81 79 77 76 74 73 71 70 69 68 67 66 65 65 64 63 63 62 61 61 60 60 59
200 88 85 83 81 79 78 76 75 73 72 71 70 69 68 67 66 65 65 64 63 63 62 61 61 60 60
210 88 85 83 81 80 78 76 75 74 73 71 70 69 68 68 67 66 65 64 64 63 63 62 61 61 60
220 88 85 83 82 80 78 77 75 74 73 72 71 70 69 68 67 66 66 65 64 64 63 63 62 61 61
230 88 85 84 82 80 79 77 76 75 73 72 71 70 69 69 68 67 66 66 65 64 64 63 63 62 61
240 88 86 84 82 80 79 78 76 75 74 73 72 71 70 69 68 68 67 66 65 65 64 64 63 63 62
250 88 86 84 82 81 79 78 77 75 74 73 72 71 70 70 69 68 67 67 66 65 65 64 64 63 63
 Prob(A) > 60  40 <= Prob(A) <= 60  Prob(A) < 40
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